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ARAVE v. CREECH
113 S. Ct. 1534 (1993)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
In 1981, while serving life sentences for other murders, Tho-
mas Eugene Creech beat and kicked to death a fellow inmate at the
Idaho State Penitentiary. The victim, David Dale Jensen, was
serving a sentence for stealing automobiles. Prior to his incarcera-
tion, part of Jensen's brain had been removed and a plastic plate
inserted in his skull. Though Creech himself gave conflicting
accounts of the incident, the Idaho Supreme Court found that Jensen
had approached Creech wielding, as a weapon, a sock filled with
batteries. Creech took the weapon away, beat Jensen until the plate
in his head broke, and kicked him about the throat and head. Jensen
died later the same day.
Creech pleaded guilty to first-degree murder. In accordance
with Idaho law,' the judge held a sentencing hearing, after which he
issued written findings in the format prescribed by Rule 33.1 of the
Idaho Criminal Rules. Under the heading "Facts and Argument
Found in Aggravation," the judge stated:
[T]he victim, once the attack commenced, was under the
complete domination and control of the defendant. The
murder itself was extremely gruesome evidencing an
excessive violent rage. With the victim's attack as an
excuse, the.., murder then took on many aspects of an
assassination. These violent actions . . . went well
beyond self-defense.
2
The judge then found beyond a reasonable doubt five statutory
aggravating circumstances, including that Creech, "[b]y the mur-
der, or circumstances surrounding its commission, ... exhibited
utter disregard for human life."3 Finding that the aggravating
circumstances outweighed the mitigating, the judge sentenced
Creech to death.
After remanding for the trial judge to impose sentence in open
court in Creech's presence, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. The
court rejected Creech's argument that the "utter disregard for
human life" circumstance is unconstitutionally vague, reaffirming
the limiting construction it had placed on the statutory language in
State v. Osborn,4 that "the phrase is meant to be reflective of acts or
circumstances surrounding the crime which exhibit the highest, the
utmost, callous disregard for human life, i.e., 'the cold-blooded,
pitiless slayer.'
5
The United States District Court for the District of Idaho
denied habeas relief. However, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
'Idaho Code § 19-2515(d) (1987).
2 Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. 1534, 1539 (1993).
3 Id. at 1539.
4 631 P.2d 187 (Idaho 1981).
- Id. at 201.
6 Creech v. Arave, 947 F.2d 873, 884 (9th Cir. 1991).
7 497 U.S. 639 (1990). See case summary of Walton, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 5 (1990).
8 947 F.2d at 884.
9 Id. at 884-85.
10 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
1 497 U.S. 764 (1990). See case summary of Lewis, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 7 (1990).
Circuit agreed with Creech that the"utter disregard" phrase does not
adequately channel sentencing discretion, and that the narrowing
construction fails as well, because it calls for a subjective determi-
nation, rather than defining the terms of the statutory aggravating
circumstance through objective standards6 as required by Walton '.
Arizona.' The Ninth Circuit was also unable to reconcile the trial
judge's findings, that Jensen attacked Creech "without provoca-
tion" and that the murder "evidenced an excessive violent rage,"
with the conclusion that Creech was a "cold-blooded, pitiless"
killer." The Court of Appeals therefore found the "utter disregard"
standard facially invalid.'
HOLDING
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that,
because the narrowing construction placed upon the statutory
language did not consist of perjorative adjectives such as "espe-
cially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" or "outrageously vile, horrible
and inhuman," but instead defined a state of mind that is objectively
ascertainable from surrounding facts, and because the circumstance
as construed does serve to narrow the class of murderers eligible for
the death penalty under Idaho's capital murder statute, the Idaho
statutory language as construed by the narrowing construction of
the Idaho Supreme Court meets constitutional standards.
ANALYSIS /APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
The Court conducted its analysis of the Idaho "utter disregard"
aggravating circumstance against thebackground of its decisions in
two Arizona cases, Walton v. Arizona"0 and Lewis v. Jeffers,"
addressing capital sentencing discretion. The Court has held, and
noted here, that a capital sentencing scheme must "suitably direc[t]
and limi[t]" the sentencer's discretion "so as to minimize the risk of
wholly arbitrary and capricious action."' 2 The scheme must chan-
nel sentencing discretion by "clear and objective standards that
provide specific and detailed guidance, and that make rationally
reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death.' 3 The
Court cited Walton for the inquiry it must undertake to determine
whether a particular aggravating circumstance meets these stan-
dards. If the state courts have further defined the terms used in the
language defining the circumstance, the federal court must deter-
mine whether the existing narrowing construction provides "some
guidance to the sentencer."'
4
12 113 S. Ct. at 1540 (quoting Lewis v.Jeffers, 497 U.S. at 774).
13 497 U.S. at 774.
14 ,.. . [A] federal court... must first determine whether the
statutory language defining the circumstance is itself too vague to
provide any guidance to the sentencer. If so, then the federal court
must attempt to determine whether the state courts have further
defined the vague terms and if they have done so, whether those
definitions are constitutionally sufficient, i.e., whether they provide
some guidance to the sentencer."' 113 S. Ct. at 1541 (quoting
Walton, 497 U.S. at 654 (emphasis in original)). The Court found
that, as the Idaho Supreme Court had adopted a limiting construc-
tion, it was not necessary to decide whether the "utter disregard"
circumstance was facially constitutional. Id.
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In Osborn, the Idaho Supreme Court had defined "utter disre-
gard for human life" as "reflective of acts or circumstances sur-
rounding the crime which exhibit the highest, the utmost, callous
disregard for human life, i.e., the cold-blooded, pitiless slayer."' 5
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority in Creech, defined
"pitiless" as "devoid of, or unmoved by, mercy or compassion," and
"cold-blooded" as "marked by absence of warm feelings: without
consideration, compunction or clemency; matter of fact, emotion-
less.' 6 The Court went to considerable length to point out that the
Idaho Supreme Court had not used "cold-blooded" to imply or
denote premeditation.' 7 As premeditation is specifically addressed
elsewhere in the Idaho homicide statutes, the Court reasoned, had
the Idaho Supreme Court meant premeditation it would have used
the statutory language.
The import of this narrowing of the language and meaning of
the aggravating circumstance, according to the Court, is that it
requires the sentencer to make an objective determination about the
defendant's attitude toward his conduct and his victim. The terms
"cold-blooded" and "pitiless" describe the defendant's state of
mind to a degree beyond that which is necessary to prove an element
of the offense. The state of mind described by the aggravating
circumstance is not the mens rea required by the homicide statutes,
but is in fact an absence of feeling or sympathy about and toward the
act and the victim. The Court noted the difficulty of finding the
negative, but held that the construction adequately guides the
discretion of the sentencer in that it "defines a state of mind that is
ascertainable from surrounding facts."'"
In conducting its analysis, the Court noted that it was not faced
with pejorative adjectives such as "especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel" or "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman."' 9
Because these terms describe a crime as a whole, the Court has held
them to be unconstitutionally vague.2" The Idaho "utter disregard"
circumstance and its narrowing construction of "cold-blooded,
pitiless slayer," as construed by the Court, survive because they
describe only the defendant's attitude toward his act and his victim,
and not the crime as a whole.
The Court's application of this reasoning and analysis is
crucial to the Virginia practitioner litigating the constitutionality of
the Virginia "vileness" factor. The Virginia "vileness" aggravating
circumstance requires a sentencer to find that a defendant's "con-
duct in committing the offense was outrageously or wantonly vile,
'1 631 P.2d at 200-01.
16 113 S.Ct. at 1541 (citing Webster's Third New International
Dictionary at 1726 (1986)). It is important to note, as the Ninth
Circuit did below, that the trial court's finding that Creech's actions
"evidenc[ed] an excessive, violent rage," 113 S.Ct. at 1539 (citing
App. 32)., does not seem to coincide with the Court's definition of
the aggravating circumstance he was sentenced under, i.e., the
pitiless slayer, "emotionless." The Supreme Court did not address
this inconsistency, however, as Creech was awarded a new sentenc-
ing hearing, at which the issue would presumably be addressed. Id.
at 1544-45.
7 In rebuttal on this point, the dissent cited Justice O'Connor's
own words for the majority in United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152,
170 (1982):
Justice O'Connor, writing for the court, described the
District of Columbia's homicide statute: "'In homespun
terminology, intentional murder is in the first degree if
committed in cold-blood, and is murder in the second
degree if committed on impulse or in the sudden heat of
passion."'
113 S. Ct. at 1548. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
"1 113 S. Ct. at 1542. See United States Postal Service Board
of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,716-717 (1983) ("The state
of a man's mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion. It is
horrible or inhuman, in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or
aggravated battery to the victim."'2' It is clear from the holding of
Godfi'ey v. Georgia,2 2 and subsequent Supreme Court holdings,
that the statutory language is unconstitutional on its face. In
applying the Walton vagueness analysis to Virginia's aggravating
circumstance, then, the Court would have to look to the narrowing
construction, as it did with Idaho's. Though the Court found that the
Idaho construction survived scrutiny, the opinion does not suggest
the same result for Virginia's narrowing construction, and in fact
indicates the contrary.
The Supreme Court of Virginia, in Smith v. Commonwealth,23
has construed "depravity of mind" to mean "a degree of moral
turpitude and psychical debasement surpassing that inherent in the
definition of ordinary legal malice and premeditation."24 The court
contextually construed the term "aggravated battery" to mean "a
battery which, qualitatively and quantitatively, is more culpable
than the minimum necessary to accomplish an act of murder."
2'
Arguably, Virginia's narrowing construction is deficient be-
cause of language and characteristics the Court has found
unconstituional in the past, but found not to be present in the Idaho
construction. The Virginia construction describes the crime as a
whole, in that it addresses the defendant's conduct in committing
the entire offense. Further, it requires the sentencer (in Virginia,
usually ajury) to know and assess the legal terms of art "malice" and
"premeditation," and then make a subjective and comparative
determination about the facts surrounding the act in question. If the
sentencer feels that the "degree of moral turpitude and psychical
debasement," patently pejorative terms, displayed by the act sur-
pass the legal requirements for the commission of first degree
murder, then the sentencer may find the aggravating circumstance.
Further, the language requires the fact finder to assess the legal
concept of "murder," determine the degree of culpability in the
battery underlying the killing in question, and measure the one
against the other. In no way is either of the undertakings an
objective determination about some aspect of the act that will guide
the sentencer in discerning agreater degree of individual culpability
in a particular defendant. They do not suitably direct and limit the
sentencer's discretion "so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary
and capricious action. '26 Because the Smith construction is
indeterminate and subjective, it does not add any measure of
specificity to the language of the circumstance. What is left is the
true that it is very difficult to prove.., but if it can be ascertained
it is as much a fact as anything else." (quoting Edginton v.
Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch.Div. 459, 483 (1885))). Id.
19 113 S. Ct. at 1541.
20 Id. (citing Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 1 (1990) (per
curiam). See case summary of Shell, Capital Defense Digest, Vol.
3, No. 2, p. 3 (1991); See also Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356
(1988); case summary ofMaynard, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 1,
No. 1, p. 15 (1988); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
21 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(C) (1990).
22 446 U.S. 420 (1980). The Godfrey court found the
defendant's death sentence invalid because of the failure of the state
court to apply a constitutional limiting construction to the aggravat-
ing circumstance where a murder is found to be "outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture,
depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim." The Court
found that "[tihere is no principled way to distinguish this case, in
which the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases in which
it was not." Id. at 433. See Lago, Litigating the Vileness Factor,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 2 5 (1991).
12 219 Va. 455, 248 S.E.2d 135 (1978).
24 Id. at 478, 248 S.E.2d at 149.
25 Id.
26 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976).
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very language rejected as constitutionally infirm by the Godfrey
Court.
In Shell v. Mississippi,27 the Court examined limiting instruc-
tions very similar to Virginia's Smith construction. In Shell, the
Mississippi trial court instructed the sentencing jury that "heinous"
meant "extremely wicked or vile;" that "atrocious" meant "outra-
geously wicked and vile;" and that "cruel" meant "designed to
inflict a high degree of pain with indifference." '28 The Court's
summary opinion stated that these limiting constructions are not
constitutionally sufficient. In his concurrance, Justice Marshall
wrote that, "there is no meaningful distinction between these ...
formulations and the 'outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and
inhuman' instruction expressly invalidated in Godfrey v. Georgia,"
as they provide no further guidance to the sentencer.29 The Georgia
factors are, of course, facially identical to Virginia's.
The Supreme Court of Virginia has held that a trial court's
refusal to give a definitional instruction to the jury and instead
instructing only in the statutory language of aggravating factors
"does not constitute reversible error. ' 30 While Virginia's limiting
construction has not yet been addressed by the United States
Supreme Court, the decision in Shell indicates that even if the trial
court elects to give it as a limiting jury instruction, it is probably not
sufficient and should be consistantly challenged.
The second part of the Court's analysis of the Idaho "utter
disregard" circumstance also suggests that Creech provides no
support for the Virginia "vileness" factor. Here, the Court ad-
dressed the degree to which the aggravating circumstance narrows
the class ofpersons eligible for the death penalty. Justice O'Connor
stated that if the sentencer could fairly conclude that the aggravating
circumstance applies to every defendant eligible for the death
penalty, the circumstance is constitutionally infirm. 3' The accept-
ability of the Idaho narrowing construction hinges, under this
analysis, on the great breadth of the Idaho capital murder statute.
While the Court acknowledged that the word "pitiless," standing
alone, "might not narrow the class of defendants eligible for the
death penalty," it found that, given the Idaho statutory scheme, a
sentencing judge could reasonably find that not all Idaho capital
murderers are "cold-blooded.1
32
Under the Idaho murder statute,33 all first-degree murderers are
eligible for the death penalty. Further, the class of first-degree
murderers under Idaho law is itself broad and includes some who
kill without specific intent or who kill with some provocation. 3
Some of these death-eligible defendants, therefore, do exhibit
feeling. "Some, for example, kill with anger, jealousy, revenge, or
a variety of other emotions. '35 Idaho satisfies the narrowing
requirement, then, because it has "identifie[d] the subclass of
defendants who kill without feeling or sympathy as more deserving
of death." 36
27 498 U.S 1 (1990) (per curiam). See case summary of Shell,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 3 (1991).
28 498 U.S at 2.
29 Id. at 4 (interior cites omitted).
I Clarkv. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 237,243,257 S.E.2d 784,
790 (1979). Though the Supreme Court has not addressed this
ruling as yet, the decisions in Godfrey, Maynard, and Shell indicate
that this opinion is no longer good law.
3, 113 S. Ct. at 1542 (citing Maynard, 486 U.S. at 364
(invalidating circumstance that "an ordinary person could honestly
believe" described every murder)) (emphasis in original).
32 113 S. Ct. at 1543.
33 Idaho Code § 18-4004 (1987).
1 Idaho Code § 18-4001 (1987). The Court noted that these
homicides would be second-degree murder in other jurisdictions,
but are elevated to the first degree under Idaho law by the presence
In contrast, the Virginia capital murder statute, in enumerating
the categories of killings that qualify a defendant for the death
penalty, specifies that under each category the killing must be
"willful, deliberate, and premeditated," and must include a predi-
cate felony or further circumstance. 7 This language eliminates
those who act with any provocation or without specific intent. The
requirement that an aggravating circumstance must "genuinely
narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty" is much
harder to satisfy when applied to the Virginia statute than when
applied to the broad Idaho statute.
The Idaho construction eliminates from the death eligible class
those who kill with some emotion or feeling, defendants who are
initially included in the class of first-degree murder defendants.
Virginia's definition of first-degree murder, however, already lim-
its the class to those who kill with specific intent in the course of
certain specified conduct. The Virginia "vileness" factor does not
narrow this class in any way.
Arave v. Creech also provides some additional guidance for
defense attorneys in habeas proceedings. The Godfrey and Maynard
line of cases suggests that appellate action by state courts can save
a death sentence even if instructions at trial were insufficient.33 In
Walton, the Supreme Court advised that federal courts were not to
undertake a review of state appellate courts' application of an
aggravating circumstance, when evaluating a claim that the court
was not consistantly adhering to a constitutionally acceptible nar-
rowing construction. However, in Sochor v. Florida, the Court
found that the Florida Supreme Court had not adhered to a single
limiting construction of its "heinousness" factor.39 In Jeffers, the
Court stated that the question whether state courts have applied an
aggravating circumstance properly is separate from the question
whether the circumstance, as applied, is facially valid.40 In Creech,
the Court uses these precedents to hold that "a federal court may
consider state court formulations of a limiting construction to
ensure that they are consistent. But our decisions do not authorize
review of state court cases to determine whether a limiting construc-
tion has been applied consistently."'
When arguing in habeas proceedings, then, that nothing the
Supreme Court of Virginia has done saves the
"vileness"circumstance from constitutional infirmity, it is impera-
tive to be aware of and honor this distinction. While the distinction
may be specious and for practical purposes purely semantic, the
lesson seems to be that deficiencies in Virginia's application of the
"vileness" circumstance should characterized as failure to adhere to
a single limiting construction. 42 Federal courts will not review the
application of narrowing constructions. They will review the
consistency of their formulations.
Summary and analysis by:
H. Ernest Stone
of additional factors, one of which, that the homicide was commit-
ted by an inmate serving time for a prior murder, was applicable to
Creech. (See Idaho Code § 18-4003(c)(1987)). 113 S.Ct. at 1543.
35 113 S. Ct. at 1543.
36 Id.
37 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31 (1990).
38 See, e.g., Smith v. Dixon, 996 F.2d 667 (4th Cir 1993) and
case summary of Smith, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
39 Sochor v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2114 (1992). See case
summary of Sochor, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 11
(1992).
40 497 U.S. at 778-80.
4, 113 S. Ct. at 1544 (emphasis added).
42 See Sochor, 112 S. Ct. 2114 (holding that Florida state courts
had not adhered to a single limiting construction of "heinous,
atrocious or cruel").
